Dingell/Boucher White Paper on Climate Change Design
As reported earlier today, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce and its Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality issued the second of its planned series of “white papers” intended to identify issues to be resolved in designing comprehensive climate change legislation. The white paper on “Competitiveness Concerns and Engaging Developing Countries” focuses on a crucial set of issues insufficiently understood and infrequently addressed.
First, the white paper discusses the potential tensions between aggressive action by the United States to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and impact on the global competitiveness of domestic industries vis-à-vis industries operating in countries not subject to such stringent emissions limitation. Then, the document summarizes three approaches for addressing those tensions, each proposing a different mechanism to induce developing countries to enact their own GHG reductions systems. Central to each approach are the trade implications of the various mechanisms. As the white paper states: “[a]ny provisions inducing developing countries to limit greenhouse gas emissions will have to pass muster before the World Trade Organization (WTO).” White Paper at 12 (emphasis added).
The white paper states that the Committee’s goal is:
to craft legislation limiting U.S. carbon emissions that also induces developing countries to limit their emissions growth (1) on a timetable that meets both environmental and trade competitiveness concerns; (2) in a manner that is reasonably certain to withstand challenge before the World Trade Organization (WTO); and (3) on terms that pose acceptable risks to U.S. interests in the event of a negative WTO determination.
Id. at 2. The approach identified in the paper least likely to cause major trade disputes is the one proposed by Environmental Defense - an approach that uses trade policy as a tool and leverages access to the U.S. carbon market. This proposal includes offering “emission premiums” to countries that take early action, imposes emissions “multipliers” on emissions credits generated in uncapped countries (i.e., such credits would be devalued in the U.S.), and requiring the President to negotiate bilateral or multilateral carbon market access agreements.
Whatever the approach ultimately adopted, the “‘vague nature of WTO law’” creates major uncertainty with respect to the validity of the U.S. legislation. This uncertainty and the unrestricted nature of WTO remedies - authorized retaliatory measures need not be directed to the economic sector involved in a specific dispute. For example, a provision relating to the steel industry found to violate WTO law could result in a countermeasure directed against the automobile industry. The white paper postulates a worst case scenario: “emissions from our trading partners could increase, the environmental benefit of any U.S. reductions could be overwhelmed by emissions growth elsewhere, domestic industry could be harmed and jobs lost, and U.S. industry could face unpredictable retaliatory measures as a result of a negative WTO determination.” Id. at 14.
Parties involved in the ongoing climate change legislative activity ignore the potential trade implications of provisions they believe will protect their interests at their peril.
For further information about this topic, please contact Akin Gump.


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